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ABSTRACT 
 
Revenge and Responsibility in Contemporary  
War Crimes and Courts-Martial. (December 2011) 
April Sharon Garcia, B.A.A.S., Texas A&M University - Kingsville 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Stjepan Gabriel Meštrović 
 
 This thesis seeks to address the recurring theme of revenge within war as 
exhibited in the recent upsurge of war crimes within the past ten years. To begin, I 
present an overview of Emile Durkheim‘s perspective on punishment from The Division 
of Labor in Society. I argue that contemporary punishment is still primitive in nature and 
maintains a retributive form.  This synopsis opens the discussion of two key factors 
within punishment: revenge and responsibility. To analyze these key elements, I conduct 
a content analysis utilizing courts-martial transcripts not readily available to the public 
for the recent cases of Operation Iron Triangle, the Baghdad Canal Killings and the 
Afghan Kill Team murders. As an historical comparative to the latest war crimes, I also 
analyze the My Lai case from Vietnam, using documentary transcripts with veterans 
involved in that operation. Throughout the analyses of all four cases, I employ the work 
of Paul Fauconnet‘s Responsibility which further develops Durkheim‘s ideology of 
revenge and augments our own understanding of collective and individual responsibility 
in society. I close this thesis with a discussion on Fauconnet‘s ―law of war‖ and its 
implications for soldiers enlisted in war time. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Context and Thesis Statement 
 As we approach the 10th anniversary of what experts are projecting will be the 
longest war in American history, we have cause to examine its properties and what those 
properties mean for the men and women fighting in it, as well as American society.  For 
many years now, we have watched news reports on suicide bombings, ambushes by 
insurgents, soldiers dying in combat and much more. These media reports are typical of 
any war in general. However, what is of particular interest is the reappearance of crimes, 
clearly marked as war crimes, which have been reported since this latest war has begun. 
In order to better understand this resurgence of war crimes, we must examine the two 
components constantly present in war: revenge and responsibility. To accomplish the 
task of explaining the function of revenge and responsibility in this phenomenon I will 
utilize the works of Paul Fauconnet and his predecessor, the first professor of sociology, 
Emile Durkheim. 
Background 
 This project began in a graduate seminar aptly titled War Crimes. Critical 
analysis of numerous transcripts from various courts martial revealed a series of themes 
developing throughout. The theme most prominent in the transcripts and various other 
resources on war crimes was punishment. Being a criminological and budding  
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Sociological Theory. 
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 Durkheimian scholar, I realized that Durkheim‘s work on punishment was most relevant 
and applicable to all the cases. Little work has been done in the development of 
Durkheim‘s position on punishment within criminology (Cladis 1999; Breathnach 2002; 
Vold, Bernard and Snipes 2002), in general and especially with regard to war crimes. 
This project will expand on the prior work by contributing an analysis of Durkheim‘s 
perspective on punishment within the context of war crimes.  
Methodology 
 The purpose of this project is to explore the functionality of two key elements in 
punishment, which are revenge and responsibility, by conducting a content analysis of 
various courts-martial transcripts.  The War Crimes graduate lecture series found here 
http://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/MZStore.woa/wa/viewiTunesUCollection?id=3943
84077  provides valuable commentary pertinent to the transcripts of three of the most 
current cases in this project. The transcripts themselves are significant for the completion 
of this project as access to them in hard copy form is difficult.  This is because there is 
no central repository of the transcripts from war crimes courts-martial, even though the 
transcripts are considered to be public records.  The other case which will be used as an 
historical comparative is the My Lai case from Vietnam. The content analysis portion of 
this case is provided by the transcripts from the PBS documentary American Experience: 
My Lai (2010) and the short film documentary Interviews with My Lai Veterans by 
Joseph Strick (1970).  Durkheim‘s Division of Labor (1984) provides the basis for the 
implication of revenge in punishment and Fauconnet‘s Responsibility: A Study in 
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Sociology translated by William Jeffrey, Jr. (1978) provides the foundation for the 
application of revenge and the implication of responsibility in punishment. This 
translated version of Responsibility by Jeffrey, Jr. is invaluable to this undertaking as it 
is the only English translation available in the world and as of this date has not been 
published.  In addition to using Durkheim‘s Division of Labor, I will also look to 
Seamus Breathnach‘s work, Emile Durkheim on Crime and Punishment (An Exegesis) 
(2002) to assist in the establishment of punishment as revenge. 
Punishment 
 What is punishment? To begin to understand punishment, we must first 
understand that ―punishment constitutes an emotional response‖ and this ―passionate 
response [is] graduated in intensity‖ (Durkheim 1984: 44, 47). Durkheim expanded on 
this by stating ―we need only observe how punishment operates in the law-courts to 
acknowledge that its motivating force is entirely emotional. For it is to the emotions that 
both prosecuting and defending counsel address themselves (1984: 47). On this point, 
Breathnach elaborates that the ―defense counsel seeks to excite sympathy for the 
defendant and the prosecution evokes the social sentiments that the accused has violated 
(2002: 26). Indeed in the transcripts used for this project, the closing arguments for the 
defense and the prosecution are replete with emotional suggestions in an effort to sway 
the jury either in favor of the defendant or in favor of the prosecution.  
 Durkheim further explained that punishment ―is still an act of vengeance, since it 
is an expiation. What we are avenging, and what the criminal is expiating, is the outrage 
to morality‖ (1984: 47). This outrage is the emotional response expressed by ―we,‖ the 
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society, which has taken over the private acts of vengeance (Durkheim 1984: 49). This is 
so because as Durkheim described, ―since the penal law cannot have changed its nature 
through this simple transfer, there is thus nothing peculiarly social about it. If society 
appears to play a predominant role it is only as a substitute for individuals‖ (1984: 49). 
In other words, if in primitive society individuals undertook the task of private acts of 
vengeance, and now society, being a substitute for individuals, undertakes said acts, then 
we are still operating in a primitive form of punishment. This argument by Durkheim is 
important in understanding the nature of punishment within our criminal justice system, 
be it civilian or military. The cases presented in this work, primarily the current cases 
resulting from the war in Iraq and in Afghanistan, are revolving around the passions 
evoked by the most emotionally charged accusation, that of premeditated murder. 
Because premeditated murder requires one to have thought about all the elements of the 
murder prior to committing it, it is in essence, very cold and calculated. It leaves the 
accused appearing devoid of any humanity whatsoever, and thus deserving of the 
harshest penalty applicable.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE ROLE OF REVENGE IN WAR 
 
 
 
What Is Revenge? 
 
 When one thinks of revenge, one can also call to mind vengeance, retribution, 
payback, retaliation, reprisal, avenging, and vendetta.   In the previous chapter I 
demonstrated how Durkheim described punishment as taking the structure of vengeance 
and that punishment remains primitive in nature. Fauconnet, being a student of 
Durkheim, continued to study vengeance as a form of punishment. The following 
sections in this chapter will expand upon the concept of retaliation and punishment as a 
primal characteristic in war.  
Revenge in Vietnam 
The first public case of wartime revenge that I present here took place in the 
Vietnamese village of My Lai in 1968. Soldiers involved in this massacre have made 
public their versions of how the operation was relayed to them by their commander, 
Captain (CPT) Ernest Medina. In a documentary titled ―Interviews with My Lai 
Veterans‖, directed by Joseph Strick in 1970, one of the interviewees is Gary Garfolo. 
Here is an excerpt from the interview: 
Interviewer:  On the night before the attack your company commander gave a 
talk to the men. What did he say? 
Gary Garfolo:  Well he ran down the operation to us. He told us that we were 
getting a chance, there was gonna be a mission, and that we were gonna be lifted 
in by helicopters, and there was gonna be security and that we were gonna go in 
there in to the Pinkville and we had a chance to get back for some of the guys 
that we‘d lost in that area. That there was supposed to be Vietcong in there. At 
that time the intelligence report said that they are in there and that they were 
 6 
gonna be there. And that when we landed that when at the time of the operation 
there wasn‘t gonna be any villagers in the area that were innocent. They were 
gonna go to the market or go out in the fields. You know the people that should 
be working that work every day are gonna be out in the fields. The people that go 
to the market are gonna be at the market. And if there‘s any VC in there, they‘re 
gonna be there then.  
 
We can see that within the statement given by CPT Medina to his troops over the 
operation based on intelligence, there is an insertion of play on emotions by CPT 
Medina. Most times, directives are given as a matter of fact without the addition of 
emotion inducing characteristics. In Garfolo‘s recollection of CPT Medina‘s speech, he 
states ―we had a chance to get back for some of the guys that we‘d lost in that area‖ 
(Strick 1970). Garfolo later explains that the speech revved up the soldiers into a fighting 
mode and they became excited to go out and fight this enemy that had claimed some of 
their men.  Similarly, in the documentary by PBS in 2010 titled ―American Experience: 
My Lai‖, soldiers involved tell of the same type of sentiment felt amongst them prior to 
learning of the plan for the operation. 
Joe Grimes, Squad Leader: I believe that the month of February was our most 
devastating month for Charlie Company. It drove us to the ground. It‘s just like if 
you had a wound, and they would stick something in that wound and go a little 
bit deeper. Every time somebody else got killed, and it was like that wound, and 
it would go a little deeper. And the hurt never stopped.  
 
Lawrence La Croix, Squad Leader: They know where the mines and booby 
traps are, they have to or they can‘t work in the fields, they can‘t move between 
villages, you know. So they know where everything is. But they‘re not gonna tell 
you. They‘re gonna let you blow your leg off. You begin to hate and the hatred 
becomes very intense and very real (Goodman 2010). 
 
Here we can see how the feelings of resentment toward the residents of My Lai were 
rapidly and dangerously building toward revenge. 
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Michael Bilton, Writer: By the time it got to the fifteenth of March, Charlie 
Company were pretty well wound up. They were told that there was a very good 
opportunity the next day that they would meet the enemy head on. There was a 
lot of talk about a battalion, the 48th VC infantry battalion. They were thought to 
be a pretty crack outfit, and they were said to be housed in and around the My 
Lai area. The brigade commander, a man called Colonel Oran Henderson, 
wanted his battalions to be much more aggressive with the enemy. And it‘s fair 
to say Henderson wound up Medina, and Medina wound up Charlie Company. 
 
Voice of Captain Ernest Medina (Archival) : I told them this would give them 
a chance to engage the 48th VC battalion, that the 48th VC Battalion was the one 
that we had been chasing around the Task Force Barker area of operation, and 
that we would finally get a chance to destroy the 48th VC Battalion. 
 
Fred Widmer, Radio Operator: Medina was psyched because here's our chance 
to confront the enemy. We're getting our revenge on you. We're going to tear 
your ass apart for what you've done to us (Goodman 2010). 
 
This last statement by Widmer speaks volumes of what the atmosphere was like prior to 
what took place in My Lai. The soldiers themselves were like ticking time bombs ready 
to explode and all they needed was a legitimate reason to do so. 
Revenge in Iraq 
 The next case exhibiting revenge in war is from the Iraq War and involves a pep 
talk by Colonel (COL) Michael Steele that is very similar in nature to that given by CPT 
Medina in the My Lai case. COL Steele, like CPT Medina, also played on the emotions 
of the soldiers by reminding them of the events that occurred on September 11, 2001. 
Here is an excerpt of COL Steele‘s speech given before the start of Operation Iron 
Triangle (OIT) in 2006 (Meštrović 2009: 21): 
Here are the things I want you to know. Number One, anytime you fight, 
anytime you fight, you always kill the other son-of-a-bitch. Always. Do not let 
him live today, so he will fight you tomorrow. Kill him today. They‘ll make more 
of them, they‘re out there damn everywhere, there‘s plenty of them. Kill him 
today. Don‘t let him live. 
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So, I want to be very clear. If you go out and somebody presents a lethal threat to 
you, then you shoot him. Do not feel bad and think that you should have brought 
him back because I didn‘t want to talk to him. Then when you walk out that gate, 
fly out that gate, drive out that gate, I expect you to look like a killer. I have been 
in more third world countries that anybody in this room, and I tell you most of 
them do not speak English. They all speak food chain. And from the time you set 
foot in their country, they‘re checking you out, from top to bottom. They‘ve 
figured out where you are on the food chain. Because if you look like prey, what 
happens? You get eaten. If you stand there and look people dead in the eye, you 
have your weapon at ready, and don‘t you flinch. You look like you‘re not 
scared. Even if you are scared, you look like you‘re not scared. You send the 
message that I am the dominant predator on this street, and if you mess with me I 
will eat you. We are not going to be driving around Iraq raping, bartering, 
pillaging, being undisciplined. That‘s not what I‘m talking about. I‘m talking 
about the moment of truth, when you‘re about to kill the other son-of-a-bitch; I 
do not want you to choke down that pipe when thinking, man that‘s a pretty nice 
looking car he‘s driving, just shoot the damn car. Four years and two days ago, 
this flag was hanging over building number 7 World Trade Center, and a police 
officer, a good friend of mine, after they got everybody out of the building, went 
back to check one more time as he was leaving, just then, he saw the flag, went 
back and recovered the flag, got out, 10-15 minutes later what was left of the 
tower came down. This flag was where the fight started. I think it is very 
appropriate to take a piece of the World Trade Center back where they started it, 
and we‘re going to finish it. Our history‘s in this flag. And I wanted you to know 
what this flag means if you come to the headquarters and you see it down there. 
Man, it’s time to go hunting. And that’s exactly the attitude I expect you to have. 
Every time you walk out that gate, you are hunting. You are the hunter, you are 
the predator, you are looking for the prey, and that’s all. 
 
COL Steele‘s speech implicitly states that with this mission the soldiers are to seek 
revenge for what happened at the World Trade Center. The emotional trauma that the 
country suffered because of the 9/11 attacks was being used as a tool to incite the 
soldiers to become the predators that COL Steele needed them to be in order to kill 
without regret. Another example of revenge within COL Steele‘s speech comes at the 
end of his speech when he tells his men that ―it‘s time to go hunting…you are hunting. 
You are the hunter, you are the predator, you are looking for the prey.‖ Hunting in this 
sense, is not like the type of hunting where one hunts deer, quail, et cetera. For even in 
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animal hunting as a sport, it is difficult to find the revenge factor against the animals, 
since the animals will most likely be killed for consumption.  Hunting, as COL Steele is 
using it, is more like the vendetta type of ―headhunting‖ that Fauconnet describes 
occurred ―in the Philippines and among nearly all the Malaysian peoples‖ (1978: IV-15).   
The similarities between CPT Medina‘s and COL Steele‘s speeches for the purpose of 
inciting the soldiers to attack the enemy, though 30 plus years apart, exhibit a prevalent 
pattern of revenge not generally accepted in explicit form by the public.  
 The third case of revenge in wartime is from another instance in the Iraq War. 
This case is that of the Baghdad Canal Killings (BCK) which took place in 2007 and is 
somewhat different from the two examples above in that the BCK did not have an 
officially authorized speech delivered prior to the act of violence that took place. Below 
are several excerpts from various BCK transcripts. 
 SGT Michael P. Leahy:  When we got back to the COP, First Sergeant Hatley 
 pulled the whole patrol over by the clearing barrels and said that, you know, ―We 
 went out and we took care of these guys. What was done was done for Sergeant 
 Soto, who had been killed, Sergeant Guerrero, who had been killed, and for all 
 the motherfuckers that think that they can shoot us and get away with it.‖ 
 (Meštrović 2010: Hatley ROT 503) 
 ***** 
 TC:   ―First Sergeant Hatley said to all of us what happened, happened, that 
 was for Guerrero, Sergeant Soto, and Sergeant Stevenson.‖ 
 SPC Jonathon A. Shaffer:   Yes, sir. 
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 TC:  ―He said that it should never leave that group, never talk about things 
 along that line.‖  Is that correct? 
 SPC Shaffer:   Yes, sir.  (Meštrović 2010: A32 Mayo 148)   
 ***** 
 SPC Humberto Navarro:   We drove up to the COP and then we pulled up to 
 the clearing barrel; and as I was clearing my weapon, that is when First Sergeant 
 came up and he is just like, ―Hey,‖ you know ―This was for Soto and Guerrero 
 and Sergeant Steve.‖  And he is just like, ―If anybody has got anything to talk 
 about, tell them to come and talk to me.‖ (Meštrović 2010: A32 Mayo 166) 
 ***** 
 TC:   And what happened when you got back to the COP? 
 SFC Joseph P. Mayo:  All the soldiers were brought in, and First Sergeant said 
 that this was for our fallen soldiers. 
 TC:  And did he elaborate on that? 
 SFC Mayo:  He just said, ―This is for our fallen soldiers‖; if anyone had an 
 issue or if someone to talk about this, to direct him to the first sergeant. 
 (Meštrović 2010: Hatley ROT 599) 
The preceding selections are all in reference to First Sergeant (1ST SGT) John E. 
Hatley‘s justification of the killings which occurred in the canal. The witness testimonies 
explicitly show a personal vendetta as the basis for the shooting deaths of the Iraqi men. 
Unlike the vengeance sought in My Lai or OIT, which were ordered directives in which 
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official meetings were held and operations were named, the vengeance in BCK was 
similar in nature to that of street justice or more appropriately, curbside justice.  
Street justice is commonly known as seeking retribution in a manner that is not 
legally approved of. We see it occur in crime ridden areas where gangs are prevalent. 
For instance, if a gang member is killed, the gang with which the deceased member was 
associated seeks revenge on the rival gang without going to the police or other legal 
entity charged with seeking justice. Oftentimes this form of reprisal comes about 
because of a lack of respect for the legal authorities charged with punishing the initial act 
of wrongdoing. The BCK was just such an instance. In a telephonic interview of First 
Lieutenant (1ST LT) David Nelsonfischer by James T. Hill, 1ST LT Nelsonfischer states: 
The witness stated that there was a feeling down range that you are ―dammed if 
 you do, dammed if you don‘t‖.  For example, there were several instances when 
 soldiers followed the proper procedures, proper ROE, and shot at enemy forces – 
 than being relieved or reprimanded for their actions.  PSGs, Squad Leaders, were 
 being relieved even though they followed the rules.  The witness emphasized that 
 even if you do everything right down range you can get screwed (Meštrović 
 2010).  
 
The above statements illustrate the sentiments that 1ST SGT Hatley and his crew of 
soldiers were most likely experiencing prior to the BCK. If following the proper and 
legal protocol were getting 1ST SGT Hatley and his men nowhere then it makes sense 
that they would take matters in to their own hands. An additional statement from 1ST LT 
Nelsonfischer in the same interview conveys this very sentiment: 
 …that in his view these soldiers acted in ‗pre-emptive self defense.‘ The witness 
 elaborated ―when you believe the system protects ‗them‘ and not ‗you‘, that 
 provokes a total lack of respect for that system.‖  The witness was explaining that 
 everything downrange is designed to protect the insurgents, not the soldiers 
 (Meštrović 2010). 
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This passage is revelatory of the emotions that 1ST SGT Hatley and his crew were 
experiencing when the BCK occurred. Although, the actions carried out by 1ST SGT 
Hatley and his men are illustrative of vengeance in war, according to Durkheim, these 
actions are not entirely replete with cruelty. I will come back to Durkheim‘s point of 
view in the next chapter when I discuss the role of responsibility in these cases. 
Revenge in Afghanistan 
 The last and most recent case to be presented here is that of the Afghan Kill 
Team (AKT) which took place in 2010.  This case came about as a result of an 
investigation into the deaths of several Afghani men which were believed to be 
unlawful. The following excerpt is from the court-martial of Specialist (SPC) Jeremy N. 
Morlock. 
 MJ: And have you talked with your lawyers about heat of passion? 
 SPC Morlock: Yes, sir. 
 MJ: You‘re on a battlefield, I mean, your unit came under fire -- 
 SPC Morlock: Yes, sir. 
 MJ: From real enemies of the United States? 
 SPC Morlock: Yes, sir. 
 MJ: And did your platoon lose anybody? 
 SPC Morlock: No, sir.  We had some -- few fellows lose some limbs, sir, in my 
 direct platoon, but no lives were lost in my platoon, sir. 
 MJ: So, you had some serious casualties? 
 SPC Morlock: Yes, sir. 
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 MJ: Were any of these discussions or decisions to kill people made kind of in 
 the heat of that situation, or were they all things where you were calm, you were 
 cool, you were thinking about it, and you decided, ―we‘re going to kill people 
 who are not our enemies‖? 
 SPC Morlock: It might have been used for fuel at that point in time, sir, it was, 
 you know, maybe exacting some revenge, but at the end of it, sir, everyone knew 
 that it was just kind of to go out and kill someone, sir. (Meštrović 2010: Morlock 
 ROT 34) 
If you recall from Chapter I, Durkheim stated that punishment is an emotional response, 
graduated in intensity; and we know that punishment for Durkheim is vengeful in its 
nature. The line of questioning from the MJ appears to be an attempt at getting SPC 
Morlock to admit feelings of a punishing nature by using terms such as ―heat of 
passion,‖ ―under fire,‖ ―real enemies,‖ ―lose,‖ and ―serious casualties‖ to describe the 
environment in which SPC Morlock and the others were situated. SPC Morlock seems to 
have immediately understood what the MJ was getting at and frankly responded that 
while those emotions were present which would have resulted in ―exacting some 
revenge‖ the anticipated act was simply ―to go out and kill someone.‖ Now the guilt or 
innocence of SPC Morlock or the reasoning behind the killings is not what is at issue 
here. The purpose of this excerpt was to illustrate Durkheim‘s theory of passion and 
intensity within the realm of punishment 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ROLE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN REVENGE 
 
What Is Responsibility? 
 Fauconnet wrote that ―in every accusation or punishment, we principally seek an 
example‖ (1978: I-16). I take this to mean that we are seeking to make an example out of 
someone or something, which means that we must be able to place responsibility upon 
this someone or something. Consider the following passage from Fauconnet in which he 
elaborates on the seeking out of examples: 
 When the setting of an ―example‖ is deemed to be necessary, selection of the 
 sanctionee is a mere trifle. In the army, or in the schools, it happens that the 
 authorities arbitrarily hold someone responsible, as an ―example‖. In war, an 
 invader secures the submission of a people by means of ―examples,‖ without 
 bothering to discover the actual authors of those deeds whose recurrence he 
 intends to prevent. One could not claim that such ―examples‖ are useless; would 
 one say they are unjust? But on what condition is an ―exemplary‖ punishment 
 just? On the condition that the sanctionee be held to be ―responsible‖. We return 
 to the conclusion to which we were earlier led by our analysis of the principle of 
 expiation: some rules of responsibility may be added to the principle or 
 exemplarity, for the purpose of restricting and settling its application, but these 
 rules are not derived from the principle (1978: III-24-25). 
 
The above segment describes just how an example is chosen. Fauconnet explains that 
picking the sanctionee is a ―mere trifle.‖ I take this to mean that picking a sanctionee is 
in essence, no big deal. In other words, someone needs to become an example and it 
does not matter who. We can see this trifling ―picking‖ happen in the civilian criminal 
justice system, especially during the sentencing phase. For instance, if the courts are 
seeing a rise in the number of drunken driving cases, the prosecutor may pick out one of 
the cases to apply the maximum charge in order to obtain the maximum sentence to 
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make an example of that particular accused. The legal reasoning behind this move is 
―that the fear of punishment may give pause to the evilly inclined‖ (Durkheim 1984: 44). 
Durkheim‘s statement is interpreted as the doctrine of deterrence in which others are 
discouraged from committing the same offense for which the ―example‖ has been 
punished (Breathnach 2002: 27). In the sections that follow, I will elaborate my 
discussion of Fauconnet‘s passage. 
The “Responsibles” in War 
 In the previous section, I began examining a selection from Fauconnet 
concerning punishment and examples. One of the lines in the selection states ―In war, an 
invader secures the submission of a people by means of ―examples,‖ without bothering 
to discover the actual authors of those deeds whose recurrence he intends to prevent‖ 
(Fauconnet 1978: III-24-25). The plurality of the term ―examples‖ is indicative of 
collective responsibility. On the topic of collective responsibility, Fauconnet writes:  
 The recipient of sanction is not always an individual. It may be a social group, a 
 collectivity. The notion of collective responsibility often remains very 
 indeterminate….vendetta is practiced indifferently on the ―first comer.‖… In its 
 meaning as we use the term in this book, collective responsibility exists when an 
 organized society, notably a family, a political or a territorial group, considered 
 as an indivisible unity, is struck by a sanction……Nevertheless, responsibility 
 remains collective, even though the sanction reaches only one person in the 
 society, because that person is struck as a member of the group, and not as an 
 individual……Collective subjects are appropriate for responsibility, whether this 
 be vendetta or punishment. In vendetta, collective responsibility is the rule. Only 
 exceptionally does vendetta strike exclusively the sole author of the sanctioned 
 act (1978: I-37-38). 
 
The preceding quotation beautifully describes the essence of collective responsibility in 
punishment, particularly, in wartime. The way in which Fauconnet links collective 
responsibility to the vendetta makes for a very powerful statement when discussing 
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revenge and sanctions. We can better understand how Fauconnet‘s collective 
responsibility works when we explore the sanctionees of revenge in the cases from 
Chapter II.  
 In the Vietnam War case of the My Lai massacre, collective responsibility was 
placed on the Vietcong. Let us reflect on the following statements from soldiers involved 
at My Lai: 
 Greg Olsen, Machine Gunner: I remember him telling us that the villagers have 
 been warned out. There shouldn‘t be any innocents there and I think there was 
 even questions asked is ‗how would we know if they‘re innocent or not?‘ He said 
 something to the effect, if they‘re there; you‘ve got to assume they‘re the enemy. 
 
Lawrence La Croix, Squad Leader: There were no civilians. You see, that is 
the crux of what was told to us. There are no civilians, you know, these are 
Vietcong, Vietcong sympathizers, it‘s a Vietcong stronghold, they are all 
Vietcong. 
 
Michael Bilton, Writer: Medina, I believe was very clear that they were facing 
 the 48th Vietcong infantry battalion. That was the intelligence he had been given, 
 and had no reason to question it (Goodman 2010).  
 
These statements when examined closely help us to recognize the role of collective 
responsibility. The original speech made by CPT Medina to the soldiers, as recalled by 
the soldiers here, stated that Vietcong was going to be present in the village. Bilton‘s 
statement strongly confirms the expected presence of Vietcong because of his reference 
back to the intelligence report which CPT Medina used when giving his speech. The use 
of the terms ―innocents‖ and ―civilians‖ by Olsen and LaCroix and the belief associated 
with those terms in this context, which is one of expected absence, conveys to us that 
anyone or anything else left behind would have to be as LaCroix stated ―all Vietcong‖ or 
as Olsen stated, assumed to be the enemy. If you recall from Chapter II, the My Lai 
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massacre was ultimately the result of the soldiers taking revenge out on the Vietcong 
that were supposed to be in the village. The Vietcong in this context was what Fauconnet 
termed above ―an organized society,‖  ―a political or a territorial group,‖ and ―an 
indivisible unity, struck by a sanction;‖ the sanction of revenge.  
 Another example of collective responsibility can be found in the case of 
Operation Iron Triangle. Content analysis of the speech given by COL Steele brings to 
light the message that Fauconnet was communicating to us in the above passage on 
collective responsibility.  First, COL Steele‘s speech contains three instances of the 
pronoun ―them,‖ two instances each of ―they‖ and ―they‘re‖ and one instance each of 
―they‘ll‖ and ―they‘ve.‖ However, it is unclear, in the entire speech, specifically who all 
it is COL Steele is referring to when using these plural pronouns. This ambiguity in the 
blaming process for COL Steele is supportive of Fauconnet‘s philosophy that ―the notion 
of collective responsibility often remains very indeterminate.‖ Second, the ambiguity 
continues even when COL Steele makes reference to individuals in the singular form in 
his speech. For example, COL Steele mentions the term ―the other son-of-a-bitch‖ twice, 
uses the singular pronoun ―him‖ seven times, ―somebody‖ once, and finally two 
variations of the singular pronoun ―he.‖ Again, COL Steele lacks specificity in all these 
instances as to whom it is these terms are referring.  And yet again, Fauconnet‘s words 
ring true, when he states that ‗responsibility remains collective, even though the sanction 
reaches only one person in the society, because that person is struck as a member of the 
group, and not as an individual.‖  
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 Third, COL Steele expresses in his speech that his soldiers are to ―kill the other 
son-of-a-bitch‖ ―anytime you fight.‖ When punishing within the realm of collective 
responsibility, Fauconnet wrote that the ―vendetta is practiced indifferently on the ―first 
comer‖.‖ Regarding this ―first comer‖ Fauconnet wrote the following: 
 In this case, however, there is no question of designation; it does not matter who 
 is killed - - any ―first comer,‖ with the exception of members of the group to 
 which the avengers belong and its allied groups. The risk of encounter is what 
 orients vendetta. ―Every man belonging to a foreign tribe, with whom they do not 
 maintain friendly relations, is miserable, if he has the misfortune to encounter the 
 avengers‖ (1978: IV-16). 
 
COL Steele also relayed to his soldiers that ―If you go out and somebody presents a 
lethal threat to you, then you shoot him.‖ Given that the context in which this speech 
was delivered was during wartime and the environment was hostile we can presume that 
COL Steele‘s soldiers were on heightened alert for any enemy encounters and were thus 
always ready to fight. This being the case, any ―first comer‖ who came across COL 
Steele‘s men was sure to fall victim to their vengeance indiscriminately. This scenario 
corroborates Fauconnet‘s suggestion that a ―first comer‖ even as an individual is subject 
to collective responsibility in vendettas.  
 The third case of the BCK displays a different facet of collective responsibility. 
As previously mentioned, testimony was given stating that 1ST SGT Hatley was seeking 
revenge particularly for his fallen soldiers: Sergeants Soto, Guerrero and Stevenson. It 
was mentioned in the testimony that for the BCK, those responsible for the deaths of 
Soto, Guerrero, and Stevenson were a ―drive-by sniper attack,‖ ―a sniper,‖ respectively, 
and for Stevenson the culprit was not mentioned (A32 Mayo: 54-55). Again, we look to 
Fauconnet to tie together how it came about that the sanctionees in the BCK were chosen 
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by 1ST SGT Hatley and his men. Fauconnet accurately described what he called 
―Responsibility by resemblance‖ in the subsequent passage: 
 The conceptualized images of the crime and the ―responsible‖ sustain a  
 relationship of similitude in the social consciousness which judges. To this type 
 belong principally the following facts of responsibility: A. Responsibility of 
 corporeal resemblance; (1) Responsibility of effigies; (2) responsibility of 
 expiatory victims; B. Responsibility by ―spiritual‖ resemblance; C. Collective 
 responsibility of organized groups in vendetta as well as in punishment properly 
 so called….Collective responsibility is easily explained by the strong integration 
 of social groups and the slight individualization of their members. Although this 
 explanation is inadequate to account for the whole phenomenon, it has in it an 
 element of truth. When individuals are only slightly differentiated, they resemble 
 one another psychologically and even physically, because they diverge only very 
 slightly from a common type - - the collective type. In primitive societies, it has 
 been said, solidarity stems from similarities. Collective responsibility also stems 
 from similarities. To think of one of the members is to think of the entire group.  
 – D. Responsibility of affective resemblance. There is a ready presumption 
 against persons who are not liked. The judgments of opinion and of the crowd are 
 what supremely govern affective resemblance. When a crime, or even a 
 catastrophe or crisis whose criminal character is not established, moves them, 
 crowds are driven to affirm, without inquiry or on insignificant indicia, the 
 responsibility of persons or groups whom they hate or despise (1978: V-18-21). 
   
I find that the piece above contains valuable information regarding the selection of 
sanctionees within collective responsibility. The way in which Fauconnet describes how 
resemblances are perceived by the wronged is incredible. For instance, not only are the 
―responsibles‖ similar in resemblance of body, but also of mind! However, in the case of 
the BCK, the physical resemblances are what were important for 1ST SGT Hatley and his 
men because the ―responsibles‖ in this case, the snipers, could only be held responsible 
by replacing them with other actors of similar appearance or character.  
 The last example in which we see aspects of collective responsibility is in the 
AKT case. This case has elements of collective responsibility similar to those found in 
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OIT and BCK. Let us now look at some selections from the transcripts which depict 
these elements. 
 MJ: Was it crystal clear to both of you that this person that you guys had just 
 agreed to shoot was not a legitimate target, that this was going to be an unlawful 
 killing? 
 SPC Morlock: Yes, sir.  He did not present a direct threat, sir. (Meštrović 2010: 
 Morlock ROT  49) 
 ***** 
 MJ: So while your lieutenant was questioning this other person, this person 
 just presented themselves? 
 SPC Morlock: Yes, sir. 
 MJ: And again, any intelligence or other reason to believe this person 
 presented a threat? 
 SPC Morlock: Not directly, sir, no. 
 MJ: And you say, ―not directly.‖  What, if anything? 
 SPC Morlock: Just the dynamic of the battlefield, sir.  It‘s a warzone, so anyone 
 perceivably could‘ve been a threat. 
 MJ: Okay. 
 SPC Morlock: So, directly we did not feel threatened by this individual at the 
 time that it had happened. 
 MJ: When you first saw him, what was he doing? 
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 SPC Morlock: He had been brought out of his compound by Staff Sergeant 
 Gibbs, so, he was just walking along with Staff Sergeant Gibbs. 
 MJ: It was clear to you and from what Staff Sergeant Gibbs had told you that 
 he had kind of selected this guy at random, that he was not a target or a threat of 
 any legitimate, you know, military operation? (Meštrović 2010: Morlock ROT 
 52-53) 
The excerpts above take us back to Fauconnet‘s statement that ―collective responsibility 
often remains very indeterminate‖ and that ―vendetta is practiced indifferently on the 
―first comer‖‖ (1978: I-37-38). Very similarly to OIT, the Afghani man that this section 
of transcript is referring to is himself referred to as ―he‖ and ―this person‖ several times 
over, which indicates that he has not been formally identified as an author of any 
sanctioned act. Additionally, the arbitrary way in which he was chosen to be the 
sanctionee, the ―example,‖ is signified by the MJ‘s phrases ―just presented themselves‖ 
and ―selected…at random.‖ 
 This last passage by Fauconnet neatly ties together all the cases presented in this 
section pertaining to collective responsibility. In each case, we were able to see the 
similarities in how the sanctionees were chosen; even if the cases were decades apart. In 
addition to describing how it is that sanctionees were selected in these cases, the passage 
opens the floor to allow for discussion on other topics, such as race relations during 
wartime, both for those fighting in the war and those that are not.   
The “Responsibles” in War Crimes 
 We have taken a look at how responsibility falls upon a collective group when 
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avenging a wrong in war. Now we will look at how responsibility falls upon an 
individual accused in a war crime. I will begin once again with the My Lai massacre in 
Vietnam. 
 Following the My Lai massacre, CPT Medina and those involved in the operation 
were accused of war crimes. Pictures had been sold to the media depicting villagers 
being killed including women and children.  This caused an outrage with the American 
public. There were Americans who sided with the soldiers, claiming that during wartime 
anything goes. Then there were other Americans who sided with the Vietnamese and 
called the soldiers ―baby killers‖ (AE). During the scandal that ensued, only one man 
actually ended up being charged and convicted with the war crime. He became the 
―example.‖ 
 As you may recall from Chapter II, CPT Medina had held a meeting where he 
gave a speech regarding the upcoming operation which included a verbal order as to 
what was to take place during the operation at My Lai. However, whether verbal or 
written, the men are trained to believe that any order given to them is to be obeyed. In 
other words, it does not matter how the order was given but that it simply was given and 
that is all that matters. Again, I emphasize that the combat soldiers are not always, if 
they are ever, directly involved in constructing orders for operations. Consequently, it is 
assumed on our part and theirs that those who do construct the orders are responsible for 
putting them together and knowing what is legal or illegal about the order. The soldier 
being given the order should only be responsible for carrying out that order. This adds to 
the efficiency of a successful operation in which resources for checking the legality of 
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the order or sufficient time necessary to question such an order are not always a 
possibility. Lieutenant (LT) William Calley, like those soldiers ranking beneath him at 
My Lai, believed himself to be following direct orders to the best of his ability. 
Voice of Lieutenant William Calley (Archival ): I felt then and I still do that I 
 acted as I was directed, and I carried out the orders that I was given, and I do not 
 feel wrong in doing so, Sir. 
 
Aubrey Daniel, Army Prosecutor: If the orders for that operation included 
 unarmed, unresisting men, women, children and babies, it was illegal. And a 
 soldier has a duty to disobey such an order (Goodman 2010). 
 
The prosecutor for the My Lai case made the claim that the order that LT Calley 
followed was illegal. But if we go back and look at what CPT Medina said to the 
soldiers because of what was believed to be accurate information in the intelligence 
report, then we can presume that the order was legal. The order was to kill everything in 
the village in an effort to rid the village of all Vietcong and its sympathizers. Anything 
that could assist the Vietcong in surviving including clean water to drink and animals to 
eat was to be destroyed. And while the human element in us wants to believe that 
children are completely innocent victims, in the event that those children grow up to be 
Vietcong or sympathizers themselves, then to destroy them aids in the effort of total 
destruction of the Vietcong.  This ideology goes back to Fauconnet‘s writings about 
collective responsibility. Regarding the role of children in collective responsibility, 
Fauconnet wrote:   
 The collective responsibility of the family involved the responsibility of the 
 children; death, banishment, civic degradation, and confiscation extended to 
 them as well as to adults. Since the specific purpose of collective capital 
 punishment was to extinguish a family line and terminate its domestic cult, 
 children of any age were necessarily put to death (1978:  I-4). 
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 Some of the legal systems we have examined - - probably the Athenian law, the 
 law of the Twelve Tables, the Germanic law - - attest that private vengeance, 
 whose traces they preserved, must have reached the child. Moreover, the 
 responsibility of the child in vendetta has been directly observed. (1978: I-8).  
 
Again, the human element in us wants us to believe that children should be spared, but 
Fauconnet was able to find support that this is often not the case. Nonetheless, because 
we believe that we are a modern people and that killing children during war is primitive, 
soldiers like LT Calley often get charged with war crimes even if they were following 
direct orders. Once more, we are reminded of Fauconnet‘s statement on the subject of 
seeking out examples in punishment. 
 Another instance, in which soldiers were subsequently tried for following orders, 
was during OIT.  In this case, Specialist (SPC) William B. Hunsaker had been charged 
with premeditated murder as per the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), but pled 
down to a lesser charge of conspiracy to commit premeditated murder. Here is an 
excerpt from SPC Hunsaker‘s trial transcript with the original charge of premeditated 
murder as read by the presiding Military Judge: 
 MJ: All right.  Let‘s look at The Specifications of Charge III, which represent 
 violations of Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  The elements 
 of those offenses, called premeditated murder, are the same except as I will 
 describe.  The elements are: 
 One, that as alleged in each specification, a military detainee of  
 apparent Middle-Eastern descent, whose identity is unknown, but for ease of 
 reference, the stipulation of fact identifies them as MD1 and MD2, are dead; 
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Two, that their deaths resulted from your act of shooting them with a 
firearm, on or about 9 May 2006, at or near Muthana Chemical Complex, Iraq; 
  Three, that the killing of MD1 and MD2 by you was unlawful; 
  And four, that at the time of the killing, you had a premeditated design to 
 kill MD1 and MD2. 
  A killing of a human being is unlawful when done without legal  
 justification or excuse. 
  ―Premeditated design to kill‖ means the formation of a specific intent to 
 kill and consideration of that act intended to bring about death. 
  The premeditated design to kill does not have to exist for any measurable 
 or particular length of time.  The only requirement is that it must precede the 
 killing (Meštrović 2010: Hunsaker ROT 199). 
The charge of premeditated murder is heavily loaded with negative implications. Adding 
to the negativity is the fact that the identity was unknown for those that were killed. This 
gives the appearance that the killing was indeed random and without purpose. However, 
if you recall the speech given by COL Steele, he explicitly stated, ―Kill him today…Kill 
him today. Don‘t let him live.‖ And as I explained earlier, the use of the pronoun ―him‖ 
in COL Steele‘s speech implies a lack of specificity, which allowed for the order to kill 
to apply to anyone in general and no one in particular.  In addition, testimony was given 
in the Article 32 for those involved in this case in which the Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) for OIT were to ―kill all military aged males.‖ And similar to the case of My Lai, 
it was reported to those charged in the case that everyone on the island were terrorists: 
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 LT Wehrheim.:  We were told by Captain Hart through Colonel Steele that 
 everybody on the island identified as a military aged male was, in fact, a 
 confirmed member of Al Qaida in Iraq by high level intelligence. (Meštrović  
 2010: A32 OIT 501). [emphasis added] 
With this trial excerpt, we have another example of how intelligence was used to order 
an operation that somehow failed and now was the responsibility of individual soldiers. 
We can look to Durkheim for explanation of this phenomenon. Durkheim stated that 
―the vendetta is clearly a punishment that society recognizes as legitimate, but leaves to 
individuals the task of carrying out‖ (1984: 50). In the case of My Lai and OIT, 
intelligence was the driving force behind the operations. This intelligence came about by 
way of a society of military executives who orchestrated the vendetta, i.e. operation. The 
execution of the vendetta, however, was delegated to the soldiers to perform. And here is 
where the individual responsibility takes over in war crimes.  
 Fauconnet wrote that ―Collective and communicable in primitive societies, 
responsibility is, in principle, strictly personal in the most civilized societies‖ (1978: 
VIII-1). If you ask the average American if he believes he lives in a civilized society as 
compared to Iraq, he would probably answer yes. America is portrayed as a first-world 
country whereas Iraq is viewed as a third-world country. For most people, third-world 
means undeveloped or worse, backward. Keeping in this line of thinking, I argue that 
Fauconnet‘s words about responsibility becoming personal in civilized societies are still 
true to this day. Given the stigma that is associated with third-world countries, it makes 
sense that the society of the United States Army would seek to quickly rectify any 
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primitive type actions that may have taken place on their behalf. The Army, being so 
highly structured and charged with protecting the superpower of the world, cannot be 
associated with actions of a such a regressive nature as that of a third-world country. 
Thus, to separate itself and stand above the rest, the Army found it necessary to hold the 
soldiers, low-ranking soldiers, personally responsible and make examples out of each 
and every one of them individually. 
 The third case in which the ―responsibles‖ were individual soldiers was in the 
case of the BCK. 1ST SGT Hatley and his crew, like SPC Hunsaker and the others from 
OIT, were charged with premeditated murder, as per the UCMJ, for the deaths of ―four 
male detainees of apparent Middle-Eastern descent whose names are unknown by means 
of shooting them with firearms‖ (Meštrović 2010: A32 Mayo 4). If you recall from 
Chapter II, testimony was given that 1ST SGT Hatley stated explicitly that the reason for 
shooting and killing these men was for retaliation.  In this case there was no intelligence 
or executive order calling for the deaths of these four men. According to the witnesses it 
was 1ST SGT Hatley‘s lone decision to move forward with the execution of the 
detainees.  The statement from 1ST LT Nelsonfischer in his interview over the incident 
also gave insight to the environment and immediate circumstances in which 1ST SGT 
Hatley and his crew were working. But because 1ST SGT Hatley was alleged to have 
blatantly acted with the intention of retribution only premeditated murder seems like a 
just charge. However, according to Durkheim, the charge is faulty. 
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 I have established Durkheim‘s position on punishment as revenge. But Durkheim 
asked us to view revenge as more than just an act of vengeance when he stated the 
following: 
 It would indeed be mistaken to believe that vengeance is mere wanton cruelty. It 
 may very possibly constitute by itself an automatic, purposeless reaction, an 
 emotional and senseless impulse, and an unreasoned compulsion to destroy. But 
 in fact what it tends to destroy was a threat to us. Therefore in reality it 
 constitutes a veritable act of defence, albeit instinctive and unreflecting. We 
 wreak vengeance only upon what has done us harm, and what has done us harm 
 is always dangerous. The instinct for revenge is, after all, merely a heightened 
 instinct of self-preservation in the face of danger. Thus it is far from true that 
 vengeance has played in human history the negative and sterile role attributed to 
 it. It is a weapon of defence, which has its own value – only it is a rough and 
 ready weapon. As it has no conception of the services that it automatically 
 renders it cannot consequently be regulated. It strikes somewhat at random, a 
 prey to the unseeing forces that urge it on, and with nothing to curb its accesses 
 of rage (1984: 45). [emphasis added] 
 
Durkheim‘s stance on vengeance as self-defense, I argue, is what 1ST SGT Hatley and 
his men were trying to accomplish when they took it upon themselves to kill the four 
Iraqi men.  In fact, SGT Leahy himself testified that he believed the Iraqis were a danger 
to himself and the rest of the men. 
 Q: Did you go along with taking care of the detainees? 
 SGT Leahy: Yes, sir. 
 Q: And why‘d you do that?   
 SGT Leahy: Because I believed these guys were a threat to us, sir. I believed 
 that, if what happened didn‘t happen, we would have lost more soldiers or other 
 units would have lost soldiers, because I honestly feel—and still feel—that these 
 were bad guys that were trying to kill us, and it was something that we did, I 
 believe, to save lives, sir (Meštrović 2010: Hatley ROT 503). 
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 ***** 
  Q:  If snipers and insurgents are attacking you and then they are being put on 
 the street without you being told about it, you know, weeks to a month later, 
 what psychological effect did that have on you? 
 SGT Daniel K. Evoy:  It, pretty much, scares you because you know that  this is 
 a sometimes qualified sniper being put right back out on the streets to, you know, 
 just to do his job, you know, to shoot at us, kill us.  So it is not very pleasant 
 news to receive (Meštrović 2010: A32 Mayo 58-59). 
These statements from SGTs Leahy and Evoy illustrate what the mindset was for 1ST 
SGT Hatley and his men. For instance, two of 1ST SGT Hatley‘s men had already been 
killed by snipers and to know that a captured sniper would soon return to the street could 
only contribute to an increasingly anxious state of mind for these American soldiers. In 
Durkheim‘s words, the soldiers were wreaking vengeance only upon what had done 
them harm, and what had done them harm was, is and would always be dangerous for 
them (1984: 45). As Durkheim explained, this type of vengeance was far from negative 
because it served the purpose of self-defense and above all, self-preservation.  
 The last example of ―responsibles‖ in war crimes comes again from the AKT 
case. Reminiscent of SPC Hunsaker, SPC Morlock was charged with premeditated 
murder and conspiracy to commit premeditated murder. And if you recall from Chapter 
II, SPC Morlock candidly admitted that while the conspiracy may have started as a way 
of ―exacting some revenge‖ it eventually became only about going out and killing 
someone, which actually meant killing anyone. This stark revelation is what makes this 
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case different from the others I have presented thus far. This is because in the My Lai 
and OIT cases, the vendetta was executed on an order and in the BCK case, the vendetta 
was executed as a ―weapon of defence.‖ However, in the AKT case, the killings that 
resulted were neither from direct orders in the military chain of command, nor were they 
from ―heightened instinct of self-preservation in the face of danger.‖ The killings in this 
case were from an ―unoriented vendetta‖ brought about by lack of choices (Fauconnet 
1978: V-22). 
 So far we have discussed oriented vendettas in which the vendetta is acted out 
with a purpose, namely to make an example of an individual or a group. However, there 
is another type of vendetta which Fauconnet described below.  
 Thus, the orientation of vendetta is in some cases completely undetermined.…In 
 the application of punishment, however, such total indeterminacy is never 
 observed. In the case of the vendetta, the society suffering it is distinct from the 
 society exercising it; they are two enemies confronting one another in a war. 
 Nothing except their adversary‘s strength limits the avengers in making their 
 choice. The moral forces that can constrain vengeance to limit itself are absent, 
 for between indifferent or hostile strangers, how could there be an extended 
 circle of beings in whom a privilege of irresponsibility would be recognized 
 (1978: IV-20)? 
 
In SPC Morlock‘s court-martial, he testified that the victims chosen were unarmed and 
were made to appear as if they had been armed with what he termed ―drop weapons‖, 
thus engaging the American soldiers and requiring the American soldiers to fire in self-
defense (Meštrović 2010: Morlock ROT 30). Fauconnet‘s statement that ―nothing except 
their adversary‘s strength limits the avengers in making their choice‖ holds true in this 
case. Because the Afghani men were unarmed, they had no show of strength that would 
have limited the choices of the American soldiers in making the Afghani men their 
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victims. For clarification, the choices here of the American soldiers for the unoriented 
vendetta are not the lack of choices that I mentioned earlier.  
 The lack of choices mentioned above regarding the unoriented vendetta is 
important when determining the responsibility of soldiers like SPC Morlock. Below is 
testimony from Dr. Stjepan Meštrović regarding the lack of choices that the soldiers in 
the AKT were experiencing: 
 Q: Taking this back now, again, now to Specialist Morlock.  How is he -- I 
 mean, if you take a Soldier from Wasilla High School whose dad was a Vietnam 
 vet, who was a hero in his eyes, and then you put him into a dysfunctional unit, 
 which I presume he has no control over, in Afghanistan in a deployed combat 
 environment, what choice does he have to be able to correct those dysfunctions, 
 or how does he -- is there anything he could‘ve done to protect himself from this 
 dysfunction? 
 Dr. Meštrović:      There are several choices that he and other individuals did not 
 have.  They did not choose their brigade commander, they did not choose to be 
 cross-leveled, they did not choose that Gibbs would come in, or that Gibbs had 
 the connections with Colonel Tunnell.  They did not choose this ongoing conflict 
 among the commanding generals of Colonel Tunnell and his subordinates.  So, 
 both he and others in his situation are caught in a situation which they, as 
 individuals, cannot change (Meštrović 2010: Morlock ROT 144). 
The inability to be free to make proper choices that could have changed the situation for 
SPC Morlock and the other soldiers is crucial here as it denied them the opportunity to 
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escape the individual responsibility that was now assigned to them. Furthermore, 
pointing out that SPC Morlock and the other soldiers were in a dysfunctional 
environment is important in determining responsibility because as Fauconnet explains: 
 A normal individual, under pressure from abnormal circumstances, may react 
 exceptionally in a crime. Sympathy and the sense of solidarity stop us from 
 harshly judging the human who had to choose between heroism and crime, 
 especially when such a choice was imposed on him (1978: VII-12). 
 
This statement from Fauconnet wonderfully illustrates Dr. Meštrović‘s testimony about 
SPC Morlock and the others not having choices. Additionally, this lack of choices in a 
dysfunctional atmosphere contributed to this otherwise normal individual behaving in 
such a way that he became charged with premeditated murder. Fauconnet‘s statement 
informs us that it is vital that we recognize the limits that are placed on individuals and 
their choices once they enter into the military.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
Summary 
 Revenge in war is only one of many recurrent themes found in war. However, 
with the addition of Fauconnet‘s insights, which are derived from Durkheim, it becomes 
apparent that accountability goes hand in hand with retribution. This is because, in order 
to enact the concept of retribution, one has to also invoke accountability into the process. 
And, vice versa, if one begins by invoking accountability on a punishable act, then the 
next step is to enact the punishment which, I have argued, is still retributive in nature.  
Implications 
 The implications of this paper are important to the future of current and 
prospective veterans, especially those who have been or will be exposed to combat. 
Consider the following passage from Fauconnet: 
 The ―law of war‖- -another facet of ―reason of State‖ - - also necessitates 
 unprecedented judgments of responsibility. The invader assimilates to ―crimes‖ 
 certain hostile activities of the non-belligerent inhabitants of the invaded territory 
 such as, for example, the formation of resistance groups, the concealment of 
 living persons, the destruction of communications systems, etc. Naturally, he 
 regards himself as right in doing so. For the purpose of affirming, in the teeth of 
 the contrary sentiments of the conquered, that these acts are indeed crimes, he 
 decrees sanctions which seem to him to be indispensable. Very frequently, 
 however, the people‘s silent complicity will not allow him to apply these 
 sanctions to the perpetrators of the forbidden acts. He must then either endure 
 acts which he has condemned, or derogate from the ordinary rules of 
 responsibility in order to ensure repression. Adopting the second alternative, he 
 declares ―responsible,‖ in varyingly arbitrary fashion, either the village in whose 
 territory a violation may be committed against him, or the municipal authorities 
 or hostages. Unjust conduct, as viewed by the victims; excusable and even 
 legitimate, as seen from the invader‘s viewpoint (1978: VI- 2-3). 
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This selection perfectly describes what it is that American soldiers are up against during 
war. Let us look at an example from the My Lai case where Fauconnet‘s words ring true. 
In Chapter II, I provided a statement from LaCroix, an invader to Vietnam, about the 
villagers knowing ―where the mines and booby traps are.‖ La Croix‘s detestation of this 
knowledge is apparent when he stated, ―but they‘re not gonna tell you. They‘re gonna let 
you blow your leg off.‖ This is analogous to Fauconnet‘s description of the invader‘s 
assimilating ―to ‗crimes‘ certain hostile activities by non-belligerent inhabitants of the 
invaded territory‖. Because the villagers in Vietnam were not forthcoming with 
information to the invaders about how to avoid injuring themselves or worse, dying, 
soldiers like LaCroix began to build resentment towards them.  This resentment finally 
erupted under what started as a legitimate strategic operation on the village of My Lai, 
and ended with the court martial and conviction of LT Calley for the illegal killing of 
villagers.  
 Fauconnet‘s ―law of war‖ is also fitting to the BCK case. For instance, if you 
recall from Chapter III, 1ST SGT Hatley and his soldiers were charged in a military court 
for the deaths of four Iraqi men. These Iraqi men were killed as payback for the deaths 
of some of 1ST SGT Hatley‘s crew. As I explained, however, although the act of 
vengeance was charged as illegal by the military court, Durkheim‘s words transformed 
the act into one of self-defense rather than just cruelty for the sake suffering. If we agree 
with Durkheim that what 1ST SGT Hatley and his soldiers carried out was an act of self-
defense, can we not also agree with Fauconnet that what the Iraqi snipers were doing 
was also an act of self-defense? After all, the Iraqis, like Americans, have the right to 
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defend their territory against invaders. In this case, however, the sentiments on 1ST SGT 
Hatley‘s part run much deeper and are not as clear-cut as just plain old self-defense. 1ST 
SGT Hatley‘s choices in the matter here were to either A: endure acts which he has 
condemned, which in this case were the deaths of his soldiers by sniper fire; or B: 
derogate from the ordinary rules of responsibility in order to ensure repression, which 
was to kill the ―alleged‖ soon-to-be-free snipers. And while this appeared to be unjust 
conduct to the victims, 1ST SGT Hatley and his crew of invaders believed it to be 
excusable and, yes, even legitimate. This also takes us back to Fauconnet‘s statement in 
Chapter III about having ―to choose between heroism and crime.‖ For in this instance, 
had 1ST SGT Hatley died as a result of letting the Iraqi men go free, then he would have 
been a hero. But since 1ST SGT Hatley did not go that route, he was now charged with a 
crime.  
 It is a horribly unfortunate circumstance that soldiers sign up to be in a constant 
state of Catch-22 situations should they have to participate in war as part of their military 
duty.  For then, not only are they required to seek revenge upon those responsible for the 
war, as determined by the society of military executives, but they are also subject to 
expiation themselves by the very same society that compelled them to act. Regarding 
this same sentiment, Fauconnet wrote: 
 We should not forget, however, that vendetta is a war: those who wage it and 
 those against whom it is waged are equal in strength. Vendetta involves risks for 
 the avengers, for its unlimited pursuit would lead to their own self-sacrifice, and 
 their deaths would thereupon require new vendettas….Vendetta follows the 
 line of least resistance. In the absences of an association of truly restraining 
 ideas, vendetta must make its attack on the least-feared or the most-hated group 
 (1978: VIII-2-3). [emphasis added] 
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These words are true whether it is the United States v. Vietnam, the United States v. 
Iraq, the United States v. Afghanistan or the United States v. Lieutenant William Calley, 
Specialist William B. Hunsaker, First Sergeant John E. Hatley and all the other soldiers 
not mentioned here that have been court-martialed or are awaiting courts-martial. 
Vendetta, as Fauconnet stated, involved risks for all these soldiers, the avengers, as the 
unlimited pursuit led to their self-sacrifices of becoming ―examples‖ by the prosecution. 
And as we saw from the BCK case, the deaths of SGTs Soto and Guerrero did indeed 
require new vendettas, which 1ST SGT Hatley and his soldiers partook in. And here the 
cycle began again, for had it not been for the deaths that the original vendetta produced, 
1ST SGT Hatley and his soldiers might not have been in the position of being tried for the 
deaths of the Iraqi men. The concept of vendetta, however, becomes lost or rather 
disguised, when trying the soldiers for war crimes, because as Fauconnet wrote:  
 Because we are now discussing a matter of crime and public punishment, and are 
 no longer discussing vendetta, the ―responsible‖ is a member of the very society 
 which aims at his punishment. Like the crime, therefore, he is the object of a 
 collective conceptualized image freighted with sentiments all of which dictate an 
 attitude regarding him….Societies strain to punish, but they also resist 
 inculpation (1978: VII-2). 
 
This passage is telling us, that yes, because LT Calley and the others are American 
soldiers, they are members of the society, American society, which aims at their 
punishment and holds them to be the ―responsibles‖ in these cases. And like the crime, 
LT Calley and the others all become objects of the collective conceptualized image 
freighted with sentiments all of which dictate an attitude regarding them. In other words, 
because they are Americans, society places the accused in these cases alongside the 
crime and imposes a collective identity on them, so that if the crime was of a horrendous 
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nature, then so too must the accused be of horrendous character. And this sentiment goes 
against the beliefs that as citizens of a first-world country and superpower of the world, 
they could be capable of partaking in such atrocities. And so, it is at this point that 
society separates itself from those accused as it refuses to be subjected to the same 
collective identity that has befallen them.  
 If you recall in Chapter I, Durkheim told us that the nature of punishment has not 
changed and is still primitive, which means that it is still for the purpose of seeking 
revenge. In a more recent passage, we are reminded by Fauconnet, that vendetta follows 
the line of least resistance and must make its attack on the least-feared. This makes sense 
when you take into account that those accused in the cases presented here, and others of 
similar kind not mentioned in this piece, have been low-ranking soldiers, for they are the 
ones less likely to resist, which makes them easier to accuse, and the ones that are least-
feared in a reprisal. In none of the transcripts that I analyzed for the My Lai case or the 
OIT case, did I find anything suggesting that an investigation into the intelligence 
reports used and relayed to the soldiers to inform them on the operations were going to 
be conducted. An investigation would be crucial, for if the intelligence was incorrect and 
the operations were illegal from the beginning then this would release those accused 
from any guilt in the matter. However, if those accused were released from their guilt, 
then someone else would have to become accountable and this then becomes 
problematic. The case of LT Calley from the My Lai massacre is just such an example. 
LT Calley was eventually pardoned for his role in the operation because of public 
outrage which called for the society of military executives, including civilians in higher 
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echelons, to be held responsible as well, as the prevailing sentiment was that LT Calley 
was just following orders. However, in the case of Operation Iron Triangle, COL Steele 
managed to escape prosecution for his role in the incitement of the soldiers and his 
unlawful ROE. Dr. Meštrović pointed out this same sentiment in his testimony during 
SPC Morlock‘s court-martial. 
 Dr. Meštrović:   In sociology, we do have a notion of collective responsibility, 
 and a notion of individual responsibility, and they offset each other.  I‘m not sure 
 how -- I don‘t know anything about the law, I‘m not sure how that would fit, I‘m 
 going to speak as a sociologist, it‘s my opinion based on my sociological 
 understanding that to the extent that the responsibility falls on the brigade.  And 
 the dysfunctional climate, which the Army could have corrected, several generals 
 knew about it, they could have taken steps to prevent it and correct it.  But that 
 does ameliorate Corporal Morlock‘s individual responsibility.  That‘s speaking 
 as a sociological theorist (Meštrović 2010: Morlock ROT 145). 
And the public‘s attitude in both the OIT and AKT cases, decades later from the 
Vietnam era, was satisfaction or rather, indifference, to the charges and convictions of 
the low-ranking soldiers involved. Perhaps, further study regarding the civilian outlook 
on war crimes would be warranted considering the amount of war crimes that have 
resulted from this nearly decade long war. Until then, we have Fauconnet‘s words to 
ponder on how it is that society comes to inject itself into wars, straining to punish the 
other, and yet resist the inculpation which results (1978: VII-2). 
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